First unveiled in a military parade in February 2018 marking the 70th anniversary of the the Korean People’s Army’s founding, North Korea’s new solid fuelled tactical ballistic missile, the KN-23, has seen multiple flight tests from the spring of 2019 and into 2020 demonstrating a range of advanced capabilities. The missile makes use of a solid fuel composite, allowing it to fire near instantaneously from mobile transporter erector launchers, and is controlled along every stage of its flight path to maximise precision. This also allows the missile to be retargeted during flight to more effectively engage mobile targets. The missiles retain the capability to follow irregular flight trajectories and perform complex manoeuvres during flight, which combined with its hypersonic impact speed and its ability to release decoys makes it extremely difficult to intercept for even the most advanced air defence systems in service today. Advanced air defence systems such as the AEGIS have reportedly failed to track the missile, with a number of U.S. reports highlighting the platform alongside new Korean rocket artillery systems as a major threat and potential game changer for the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula. The missile has reportedly begun to replace the older Hwasong-6 and Toksa short ranged platforms in frontline service, and have an extended range of approximately 700km. Moreso than its predecessors, its primary target is expected to be enemy airfields in South Korea with the intention of disabling enemy air power in a war’s very early stages. 

North Korea has notably exported all classes of tactical missile it has developed in the past, from Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6 sales to Egypt and Iran in the 1980s to the KN-02 missiles sold to Syria in the 2000s, among multiple other examples. It is thus expected that the KN-23 will be marketed for export overseas, with potentially very serious implications for the Western Bloc countries and a number of their allies as the new hypersonic missile type bolsters their potential adversaries. Based on the requirements of a number of states and their historical purchases of Korean arms, a look at the leading potential clients for the KN-23 is given below.

Egypt

Egypt was the first ever foreign client for North Korean ballistic missiles when it purchased the Hwasong-5, with a contract thought to have been signed in 1981. The country today faces a highly unfavourable balance of power with a number of potential adversaries, and until it began to receive MiG-29M fighters from Russia around 2015 its Air Force lacked any fighter aircraft with modern air to air missiles meaning leaving it at a considerable air power disadvantage. North Korean ballistic missile classes, which today include the Hwasong-5 and 6 and Rodong-1 platforms, provide Egypt with its most important strike capability today and provide a key asymmetric means of compensating for other disadvantages. With the country investing heavily in military modernisation and continuing military cooperation with North Korea, acquisition of the KN-23 remains a significant possibility to support frontline infantry units – which are currently also being bolstered with new Russian armour and attack helicopters. It is possible that Egypt would show more interest in a longer ranged derivative of the KN-23, the name of which is not yet known, which was first unveiled in January 2021.

Hezbollah

The Iranian-funded and Korean-trained militia Hezbollah, based in Southern Lebanon, has relied heavily on North Korean technologies from rocket artillery systems to underground fortifications for at least two decades. Many members of Hezbollah’s leadership trained in North Korea in the 1980s, and the militia’s underground tunnel network was reportedly built by Korean specialists in the early 2000s and played a pivotal role in its brief war with neighbouring Israel in 2006. Hezbollah has since acquired Korean ballistic missiles through neighbouring Syria, where a number of designs were produced under license, and could well have an interest in acquiring the KN-23 to further its ability to penetrate Israeli air defences. The missile’s mobility and short launch time will be particularly prized given that Hezbollah positions above the surface will be constantly exposed to Israeli air attacks in the event of potential conflict. Hezbollah is considered a terrorist organisation by the majority of Western states, notable exceptions being Switzerland and Norway, but is not recognised as such by the United Nations or by the majority of countries. This combined with its status as a political party in Lebanon and a recognised paramilitary force has allowed it to purchase arms freely from most non-Western sources. 

Iran

Iran has been by far the leading client for North Korean ballistic missiles and other military technologies since the mid-1980s, and the large majority of Iranian ballistic missile designs are either closely based on Korean designs, such as the Shahab-3, Khorramshahr and Emad, or use Korean technologies and components, such as the Sejil. Iran fields a range of Korean missiles which have not been sold elsewhere – most notably the Musudan which is considered the most advanced ballistic missile of its kind in the Middle East today. While Iran’s strategic missile arsenal is highly advanced, its tactical capabilities have left something to be desired leading the country to seek to invest in a range of new platforms for its ground forces such as Karrar battle tanks and possibly Russian T-90 tanks. The KN-23 would provide excellent support for ground troops, and is arguably far more cost effective than investments in combat aircraft which are also under consideration. The platform’s high mobility and compactness allows it to support operations beyond Iranian territory across much of the Middle East, including in Syria and Iraq where the country’s Revolutionary Guard Corps have a growing presence. Licence production of the KN-23 in Iran is also a significant possibility. The missile would provide a much higher end strike capability than existing Iranian tactical missile designs. 

Vietnam

Vietnam today relies on North Korean Hwasong-6 and possibly Hwasong-5 missiles to provide a deterrent capability against neighbouring China, which due to the small size of its Air Force is considered critical to ensuring at least some degree of mutual vulnerability. With China’s air defence capabilities fast improving, calling the continued viability of the older Korean missiles into question, acquiring the KN-23 could provide the most capable and cost effective replacement. Vietnam’s relations with China have continued to deteriorate over territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and with Vietnam having militarised islands it has claimed in the region the KN-23 could potentially provide a very capable deterrent against escalation. 

Syria

Syria has been a major client for Korean tactical missiles, and is the only known client for the KN-02 short ranged solid fuel platform which it currently relies on heavily to penetrate well defended Israeli airspace in the event of war. North Korea has been a leading supporter of Syria’s armed forces and its health sector during a time of intensive conflict since 2011, building and fully servicing several hospitals in the country and reportedly deploying special forces units to assist counterinsurgency efforts against a range of jihadist militant groups. With war in Syria having all but ended, with the exception of small enclaves held by Turkish backed forces and others by the U.S. Military in the country’s far north, the country is looking to rebuild its armed forces with new arms – from Russian tanks and fighter jets to Iranian air defence systems. North Korea could provide a serious upgrade to the country’s ballistic missile capabilities and seriously improve its deterrent capacities against neighbouring Israel and Turkey. Although the KN-23 was designed as a tactical missile, assessment of Syria’s previous use of Korean short ranged missiles indicates that it could be used in a strategic role against its heavily armed neighbours. 

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